feat: personal access tokens with scoped bearer auth

Add cnp_ personal access tokens so the CLI, MCP server, and external
agents authenticate without a browser session — the agent-first spine
from ROADMAP2 phase A. Modeled on agent_auth_tokens: raw token shown
once, only SHA-256 hash stored.

- user_tokens table (goose migration + sqlc), name/prefix/scope/expiry,
  owner-scoped revoke, last_used_at stamping
- middleware: cnp_ bearer resolution, read scope gates mutations with
  403 SCOPE_INSUFFICIENT, non-admin scopes cap is_admin even for admin
  owners — a token never outranks its scope or its owner
- GET/POST/DELETE /api/v1/user/tokens + OpenAPI + generated types
- Settings UI: create with scope/expiry pickers, one-time token display
  with copy, list with last-used/expiry, confirm-revoke
- docs: OPERATIONS.md section, README feature line

Verified end-to-end against live Postgres: create/list/revoke, read
scope blocks PUT (403), write PAT on admin owner blocked from admin
routes (403), admin scope works, revoked token returns 401.

Authored By: TDvorak <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Tomas Dvorak committed 2026-10-08 14:31:29 +02:00
1 parent f9ae5b962c
commit e881747388
17 files changed
+1141 -30

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+178
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@@ -231,6 +231,153 @@ export interface paths {
patch?: never;
trace?: never;
};
"/user/tokens": {
parameters: {
query?: never;
header?: never;
path?: never;
cookie?: never;
};
/**
* List personal access tokens
* @description Returns the caller's non-revoked personal access token metadata. Token values and hashes are never returned.
*/
get: {
parameters: {
query?: never;
header?: never;
path?: never;
cookie?: never;
};
requestBody?: never;
responses: {
/** @description Token list */
200: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": {
tokens?: components["schemas"]["UserToken"][];
};
};
};
/** @description Unauthorized */
401: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
};
};
};
};
put?: never;
/**
* Create personal access token
* @description Issues a `cnp_` bearer token for CLI/MCP/agent authentication. The raw token is returned exactly once and never stored — only its SHA-256 hash persists. Admin-scope tokens require a platform admin account.
*/
post: {
parameters: {
query?: never;
header?: never;
path?: never;
cookie?: never;
};
requestBody: {
content: {
"application/json": components["schemas"]["CreateUserTokenRequest"];
};
};
responses: {
/** @description Token created; raw value returned once */
201: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": components["schemas"]["UserTokenCreated"];
};
};
/** @description Invalid input */
400: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
};
};
/** @description Admin scope requires platform admin */
403: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
};
};
};
};
delete?: never;
options?: never;
head?: never;
patch?: never;
trace?: never;
};
"/user/tokens/{id}": {
parameters: {
query?: never;
header?: never;
path?: never;
cookie?: never;
};
get?: never;
put?: never;
post?: never;
/**
* Revoke personal access token
* @description Marks one of the caller's tokens as revoked. Clients presenting it are rejected from then on.
*/
delete: {
parameters: {
query?: never;
header?: never;
path: {
id: string;
};
cookie?: never;
};
requestBody?: never;
responses: {
/** @description Token revoked */
200: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": {
message?: string;
};
};
};
/** @description Token not found */
404: {
headers: {
[name: string]: unknown;
};
content: {
"application/json": components["schemas"]["Error"];
};
};
};
};
options?: never;
head?: never;
patch?: never;
trace?: never;
};
"/projects": {
parameters: {
query?: never;
@@ -8476,6 +8623,37 @@ export interface components {
/** @description Human-readable label for the token (e.g. node name) */
label?: string;
};
UserToken: {
/** Format: uuid */
id: string;
name: string;
/** @description First 12 chars of the token, for identification in lists */
key_prefix: string;
/** @enum {string} */
scope: "read" | "write" | "admin";
/** Format: date-time */
expires_at?: string;
/** Format: date-time */
last_used_at?: string;
/** Format: date-time */
created_at: string;
};
UserTokenCreated: components["schemas"]["UserToken"] & {
/** @description Raw cnp_ token value, returned exactly once at creation */
token: string;
};
CreateUserTokenRequest: {
/** @description Human-readable label (e.g. "laptop cli", "ci deploy") */
name: string;
/**
* @description read = GET/HEAD only; write = all non-admin routes; admin = everything (requires admin account)
* @default write
* @enum {string}
*/
scope: "read" | "write" | "admin";
/** @description 0 or omitted = never expires */
expires_in_days?: number;
};
AgentCapabilities: {
container_runtimes?: string[];
supported_architectures?: string[];
+1 -1
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@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ export const bundledDocs: BundledDoc[] = [
"path": "guides/OPERATIONS.md",
"section": "guides",
"title": "Operations",
"markdown": "# Operations\n\nDay-2 features for running services: scheduled jobs, ad-hoc exec, managed\ndatabases, preview environments, security scans, and high availability.\n\n## Cron jobs\n\nService detail → **Cron**. Standard 5-field cron expressions (`robfig/cron`\nsyntax), per-job timezone, enable/disable, manual trigger, and execution\nhistory with captured stdout/stderr.\n\n- The scheduler ticks every minute and runs due jobs via `docker exec`\n (`sh -c <command>`) inside the service's container.\n- Executions are retained per-job (`retention` count) and visible in the UI.\n- Requires a running container — a stopped service's due job records a\n failure, it does not queue.\n\n```\nGET/POST /api/v1/cron-jobs PUT/DELETE /api/v1/cron-jobs/:id\nPOST /api/v1/cron-jobs/:id/trigger\nGET /api/v1/cron-jobs/:id/executions\n```\n\n## Exec console\n\nService detail → **Console**. One-off `sh -c` commands against the running\ncontainer: 30s ceiling, 64KB output cap, exit code + captured output shown\nper run. Debugging aid — not an interactive shell.\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/services/:id/exec {command}\n```\n\n## Managed databases\n\n**/databases** page — provision PostgreSQL/Redis/MySQL/MariaDB/MongoDB/\nClickHouse/Dragonfly as managed containers on the `containr` network.\n\n- Start/stop/restart actions; connection URL with copy.\n- **Backups**: manual snapshot now, or set a cron expression\n (`backup_schedule`) — due backups run inside the same scheduler tick as\n cron jobs. Archives live in the `containr-db-backups` volume and are\n downloadable (`GET /databases/:id/backups/:bid/download`) and restorable.\n- **Bind to service**: injects `connection_url` into a service's variables\n as a secret (`DATABASE_URL` by default). Redeploy the service afterward —\n variables are read at deploy time.\n\n## Preview environments\n\nService detail → **Previews**. Create a preview per branch/PR with a TTL,\npromote it to production, or delete it.\n\nCurrent limitation: previews are bookkeeping records — they do not build,\ndeploy, or route a real container. The generated `*.preview.containr.local`\nURL is a placeholder. Real preview runtime is tracked on the roadmap.\n\n## Security scans\n\n**/security** page — pick a project, run a scan (dependency / configuration\n/ comprehensive, optionally scoped to one service).\n\nThe scanner is heuristic config analysis, not Trivy/Grype: it flags\nunpinned image tags, `http://` source/public URLs, `npm install` without\n`npm ci`, `pip install` without hashes, `curl|sh` build steps, missing\nhealth checks, and similar smells. Findings get severity badges and can be\nresolved or ignored; the page also shows a security score, open/resolved\ncounts, scan history, and compliance status.\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/security/scans {project_id, service_id?, scan_type}\nGET /api/v1/projects/:id/vulnerabilities\nPUT /api/v1/vulnerabilities/:id {status: open|resolved|ignored}\nGET /api/v1/projects/:id/security/metrics\nGET /api/v1/projects/:id/security/history\n```\n\n## High availability\n\n**/ha** page — manager enable/disable, node/health-check/alert status\ncards, manual failover (with confirmation), per-service failover policies\n(project → service picker, strategy, min healthy nodes, max failures),\nactive alerts with resolve, and health check results.\n\nHA state is in-memory like autoscaling — policies and alerts reset on\nbackend restart.\n\n## Node agents\n\n**/usage** page → *Connect node*: issue a per-node token (`cagt_…`, shown\nonce), copy the prefilled install command, revoke tokens when done. Agents\nregister over `POST /api/agents/register` and heartbeat via\n`POST /api/agents/heartbeat`.\n"
"markdown": "# Operations\n\nDay-2 features for running services: scheduled jobs, ad-hoc exec, managed\ndatabases, preview environments, security scans, and high availability.\n\n## Cron jobs\n\nService detail → **Cron**. Standard 5-field cron expressions (`robfig/cron`\nsyntax), per-job timezone, enable/disable, manual trigger, and execution\nhistory with captured stdout/stderr.\n\n- The scheduler ticks every minute and runs due jobs via `docker exec`\n (`sh -c <command>`) inside the service's container.\n- Executions are retained per-job (`retention` count) and visible in the UI.\n- Requires a running container — a stopped service's due job records a\n failure, it does not queue.\n\n```\nGET/POST /api/v1/cron-jobs PUT/DELETE /api/v1/cron-jobs/:id\nPOST /api/v1/cron-jobs/:id/trigger\nGET /api/v1/cron-jobs/:id/executions\n```\n\n## Exec console\n\nService detail → **Console**. One-off `sh -c` commands against the running\ncontainer: 30s ceiling, 64KB output cap, exit code + captured output shown\nper run. Debugging aid — not an interactive shell.\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/services/:id/exec {command}\n```\n\n## Managed databases\n\n**/databases** page — provision PostgreSQL/Redis/MySQL/MariaDB/MongoDB/\nClickHouse/Dragonfly as managed containers on the `containr` network.\n\n- Start/stop/restart actions; connection URL with copy.\n- **Backups**: manual snapshot now, or set a cron expression\n (`backup_schedule`) — due backups run inside the same scheduler tick as\n cron jobs. Archives live in the `containr-db-backups` volume and are\n downloadable (`GET /databases/:id/backups/:bid/download`) and restorable.\n- **Bind to service**: injects `connection_url` into a service's variables\n as a secret (`DATABASE_URL` by default). Redeploy the service afterward —\n variables are read at deploy time.\n\n## Preview environments\n\nService detail → **Previews**. Create a preview per branch/PR with a TTL,\npromote it to production, or delete it.\n\nCurrent limitation: previews are bookkeeping records — they do not build,\ndeploy, or route a real container. The generated `*.preview.containr.local`\nURL is a placeholder. Real preview runtime is tracked on the roadmap.\n\n## Security scans\n\n**/security** page — pick a project, run a scan (dependency / configuration\n/ comprehensive, optionally scoped to one service).\n\nThe scanner is heuristic config analysis, not Trivy/Grype: it flags\nunpinned image tags, `http://` source/public URLs, `npm install` without\n`npm ci`, `pip install` without hashes, `curl|sh` build steps, missing\nhealth checks, and similar smells. Findings get severity badges and can be\nresolved or ignored; the page also shows a security score, open/resolved\ncounts, scan history, and compliance status.\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/security/scans {project_id, service_id?, scan_type}\nGET /api/v1/projects/:id/vulnerabilities\nPUT /api/v1/vulnerabilities/:id {status: open|resolved|ignored}\nGET /api/v1/projects/:id/security/metrics\nGET /api/v1/projects/:id/security/history\n```\n\n## High availability\n\n**/ha** page — manager enable/disable, node/health-check/alert status\ncards, manual failover (with confirmation), per-service failover policies\n(project → service picker, strategy, min healthy nodes, max failures),\nactive alerts with resolve, and health check results.\n\nHA state is in-memory like autoscaling — policies and alerts reset on\nbackend restart.\n\n## Node agents\n\n**/usage** page → *Connect node*: issue a per-node token (`cagt_…`, shown\nonce), copy the prefilled install command, revoke tokens when done. Agents\nregister over `POST /api/agents/register` and heartbeat via\n`POST /api/agents/heartbeat`.\n\n## Personal access tokens\n\n**Settings → Personal Access Tokens**: issue `cnp_…` bearer tokens for the\nCLI, MCP server, and scripts — the same privileges as your account, bounded\nby scope. The raw token is shown once at creation; only its SHA-256 hash is\nstored.\n\nScopes:\n\n- `read` — `GET`/`HEAD`/`OPTIONS` only; mutations return `403 SCOPE_INSUFFICIENT`.\n- `write` — everything except admin routes.\n- `admin` — full access; requires a platform admin account, and the token is\n still capped at the owner's privileges.\n\nA token can never outrank its owner: non-admin scopes report\n`is_admin = false` even on admin accounts.\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/user/tokens list (metadata only, never hashes)\nPOST /api/v1/user/tokens {name, scope?, expires_in_days?} → raw token once\nDELETE /api/v1/user/tokens/:id revoke (owner-scoped)\n```\n\nUse as `Authorization: Bearer cnp_…`, or `containr auth login cnp_…`.\nRevocation takes effect on the next request; `last_used_at` updates on each\nauthenticated call.\n"
},
{
"path": "guides/README_BACKEND.md",