Add cnp_ personal access tokens so the CLI, MCP server, and external
agents authenticate without a browser session — the agent-first spine
from ROADMAP2 phase A. Modeled on agent_auth_tokens: raw token shown
once, only SHA-256 hash stored.
- user_tokens table (goose migration + sqlc), name/prefix/scope/expiry,
owner-scoped revoke, last_used_at stamping
- middleware: cnp_ bearer resolution, read scope gates mutations with
403 SCOPE_INSUFFICIENT, non-admin scopes cap is_admin even for admin
owners — a token never outranks its scope or its owner
- GET/POST/DELETE /api/v1/user/tokens + OpenAPI + generated types
- Settings UI: create with scope/expiry pickers, one-time token display
with copy, list with last-used/expiry, confirm-revoke
- docs: OPERATIONS.md section, README feature line
Verified end-to-end against live Postgres: create/list/revoke, read
scope blocks PUT (403), write PAT on admin owner blocked from admin
routes (403), admin scope works, revoked token returns 401.
Authored By: TDvorak <[email protected]>
- First registered account becomes admin (users.is_admin, backfilled
to earliest account); better-auth mirror path does the same
- Public registration closes after bootstrap; admin can reopen it via
GET/PUT /api/v1/settings (admin-gated) or SIGNUP_ENABLED env
- In-app settings override env vars; secrets stored in app_settings,
token values never returned by the API
- Saving a Cloudflare Tunnel token pulls and runs a managed
cloudflared sidecar on the backend's networks; clearing removes it;
startup restores it from saved settings
- group_add DOCKER_GID grants the non-root backend user Docker socket
access; install.sh probes the in-container socket gid
- Settings page gains an owner-only Platform section (registration
toggle, tunnel token, link to Cloudflare dashboard); sign-up page
stays reachable while registration is open
- OpenAPI spec + generated types updated; manual user creation now
requires admin
Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)
Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Phase 0 cleanup verified end-to-end:
- Delete vendored APwhy runtime (cmd/apwhy, internal/apwhy) and the
unwired copy (internal/api/server.go + static bundle + cloned
internal/{storage,analytics,auth,rbac}) — ~7.5k lines of dead code.
- Keep Containr's native internal/gateway; move APwhy management
routes under /api/v1/gateway/* so they stop colliding with the
native /services paths. Fix handlers against the real schema:
UUID ids via RETURNING, integer enabled flags, plan validation,
service validate endpoint, unique-violation mapping.
- Port agents.go off GORM onto sqlc (sqlc/queries/agents.sql);
drop gorm dependencies; fix sqlc schema drift (services.environment_id).
- Replace the SELECT 1 goose baseline with the real consolidated
schema (52 tables) minus APwhy's parallel auth/RBAC objects;
idempotent via IF NOT EXISTS / OR REPLACE / guarded DO blocks so it
replays cleanly over legacy installs. Add a drop migration for the
dead objects and delete the legacy filename-tracked migrations/
loader, directory, and Dockerfile copy. Verified via cmd/migrate:
fresh install 53 tables, legacy upgrade clean to 20260917000000.
- Canvas: add invisible React Flow handles to ServiceNode so inferred
auto-connections stop emitting warning #008.
- Remove reactflow dep (superseded by @xyflow/react), test harness
cmds, and legacy 0001_init.sql backups.
Authored By: TDvorak <[email protected]>
