security: harden agent surface — vault_exec allow-list, SSRF, error hygiene

Stress-test remediation across MCP, CLI, and backend:

- primora_vault_exec rewritten as an allow-list (was deny-list):
  colon-form single-token commands bypassed it, leaking every vault
  secret; verbatim env-name injection allowed NODE_OPTIONS=--require
  host RCE. Now fixed read-mostly command set, arg/path deny regex,
  strict env-name grammar, loader-hook name blocklist. All prior
  bypasses verified denied; allowed commands still inject.
- SSRF: webhook/job URL validation now blocks cloud metadata IPs
  (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254) inside the link-local allowance
  and non-canonical IP encodings (decimal/hex bare hosts) smuggled
  as "docker service names".
- Path params encodeURIComponent in all client consumers — encodeURI
  left ?#& intact, smuggling query segments through {name} params.
- primora_upload_object strict-validates contentBase64 — Buffer.from
  silently dropped invalid chars.
- MCP no-creds startup degrades instead of crashing mid-handshake.
- GET /api/v1/context — API-key self-discovery; fixes the CLI dead
  end (login --api-key validates the key + seeds org/project,
  use/context/whoami work under key auth).
- CLI: unknown commands / bare group exit 1 with hints; mri numeric
  coercion reversed via raw-argv restore (007 stays "007");
  login --json; orgs:rm / projects:rm / buckets:rm behind --yes;
  fetch-failed errors name the cause.
- Error hygiene: pgx.ErrNoRows -> 404, pgconn codes -> clean
  400/409 without SQLSTATE leaks, validator failures formatted,
  services.InputError maps input faults to 400 (webhook URL/event
  errors were 500s), presign on local driver -> 400.
- Webhook events accept wildcard patterns (*, ns.*, custom.*)
  matched via SQL LIKE — client-published events can be webhooked.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

apps/cli/src/commands/projects.ts

@@ -50,3 +50,34 @@ export async function cmdProjectsCreate(
   }
   success(`Project "${project.name}" created (${project.slug})`);
 }
+
+export async function cmdProjectsRemove(
+  projectRef: string,
+  options: { org?: string; yes?: boolean; json?: boolean },
+): Promise<void> {
+  const cfg = loadConfig();
+  requireAuth(cfg);
+  configureClient(cfg);
+
+  let projectId = projectRef;
+  if (!isUuid(projectRef)) {
+    const me = await PlatformService.getMe();
+    const orgs = cfg.auth?.type === "apiKey" ? [] : me.organizations;
+    const found = orgs
+      .flatMap((o) => o.projects.map((pr) => ({ ...pr, orgId: o.id })))
+      .find((pr) => pr.id === projectRef || pr.slug === projectRef || pr.name === projectRef);
+    if (!found) throw new Error(`Project "${projectRef}" not found — pass its id directly.`);
+    projectId = found.id;
+  }
+  await confirmOrAbort(`Delete project "${projectRef}"? Buckets, secrets, and functions go with it.`, options.yes);
+  await ProjectsService.deleteProject({ projectId });
+  if (isJson(options)) {
+    printJson({ deleted: projectId });
+  } else {
+    success(`deleted project ${projectRef}`);
+  }
+}
+
+function isUuid(v: string): boolean {
+  return /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(v);
+}