 Tomas DvorakandDevin
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2d6135121e
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security: harden agent surface — vault_exec allow-list, SSRF, error hygiene
Stress-test remediation across MCP, CLI, and backend:
- primora_vault_exec rewritten as an allow-list (was deny-list):
colon-form single-token commands bypassed it, leaking every vault
secret; verbatim env-name injection allowed NODE_OPTIONS=--require
host RCE. Now fixed read-mostly command set, arg/path deny regex,
strict env-name grammar, loader-hook name blocklist. All prior
bypasses verified denied; allowed commands still inject.
- SSRF: webhook/job URL validation now blocks cloud metadata IPs
(169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254) inside the link-local allowance
and non-canonical IP encodings (decimal/hex bare hosts) smuggled
as "docker service names".
- Path params encodeURIComponent in all client consumers — encodeURI
left ?#& intact, smuggling query segments through {name} params.
- primora_upload_object strict-validates contentBase64 — Buffer.from
silently dropped invalid chars.
- MCP no-creds startup degrades instead of crashing mid-handshake.
- GET /api/v1/context — API-key self-discovery; fixes the CLI dead
end (login --api-key validates the key + seeds org/project,
use/context/whoami work under key auth).
- CLI: unknown commands / bare group exit 1 with hints; mri numeric
coercion reversed via raw-argv restore (007 stays "007");
login --json; orgs:rm / projects:rm / buckets:rm behind --yes;
fetch-failed errors name the cause.
- Error hygiene: pgx.ErrNoRows -> 404, pgconn codes -> clean
400/409 without SQLSTATE leaks, validator failures formatted,
services.InputError maps input faults to 400 (webhook URL/event
errors were 500s), presign on local driver -> 400.
- Webhook events accept wildcard patterns (*, ns.*, custom.*)
matched via SQL LIKE — client-published events can be webhooked.
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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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2026-09-24 21:56:11 +02:00 |
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