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Tomas DvorakandDevin 2d6135121e security: harden agent surface — vault_exec allow-list, SSRF, error hygiene

Stress-test remediation across MCP, CLI, and backend:

- primora_vault_exec rewritten as an allow-list (was deny-list):
  colon-form single-token commands bypassed it, leaking every vault
  secret; verbatim env-name injection allowed NODE_OPTIONS=--require
  host RCE. Now fixed read-mostly command set, arg/path deny regex,
  strict env-name grammar, loader-hook name blocklist. All prior
  bypasses verified denied; allowed commands still inject.
- SSRF: webhook/job URL validation now blocks cloud metadata IPs
  (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254) inside the link-local allowance
  and non-canonical IP encodings (decimal/hex bare hosts) smuggled
  as "docker service names".
- Path params encodeURIComponent in all client consumers — encodeURI
  left ?#& intact, smuggling query segments through {name} params.
- primora_upload_object strict-validates contentBase64 — Buffer.from
  silently dropped invalid chars.
- MCP no-creds startup degrades instead of crashing mid-handshake.
- GET /api/v1/context — API-key self-discovery; fixes the CLI dead
  end (login --api-key validates the key + seeds org/project,
  use/context/whoami work under key auth).
- CLI: unknown commands / bare group exit 1 with hints; mri numeric
  coercion reversed via raw-argv restore (007 stays "007");
  login --json; orgs:rm / projects:rm / buckets:rm behind --yes;
  fetch-failed errors name the cause.
- Error hygiene: pgx.ErrNoRows -> 404, pgconn codes -> clean
  400/409 without SQLSTATE leaks, validator failures formatted,
  services.InputError maps input faults to 400 (webhook URL/event
  errors were 500s), presign on local driver -> 400.
- Webhook events accept wildcard patterns (*, ns.*, custom.*)
  matched via SQL LIKE — client-published events can be webhooked.

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

2026-09-24 21:56:11 +02:00

src

security: harden agent surface — vault_exec allow-list, SSRF, error hygiene

2026-09-24 21:56:11 +02:00

package.json

feat: phase 5 distribution — tauri shell, pwa, desktop release artifacts

2026-09-16 19:59:53 +02:00

README.md

feat: encrypted secrets vault across CLI, desktop, dashboard, and backend

2026-09-24 18:46:37 +02:00

tsconfig.json

feat: ship phase 1 surface area (v0.2.0)

2026-09-16 14:04:43 +02:00

README.md

@primora/mcp

Primora MCP stdio server - exposes the platform as primora_* tools to any MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.).

Build

npm run build --workspace @primora/mcp   # → dist/server.js

Configure

Point your MCP client at node dist/server.js. The server shares the CLI's config file - primora login once and both tools work. Env vars override: PRIMORA_BASE_URL, PRIMORA_API_KEY, PRIMORA_ORG, PRIMORA_PROJECT.

Tools

30+ primora_* tools covering organizations, projects, buckets, objects, collections, API keys, integrations, webhooks, scheduled jobs, telemetry, and audit: primora_whoami, primora_list_projects, primora_upload_object, primora_query_audit, primora_run_job, …

Secrets are agent-safe by design — values are never returned by any tool:

primora_vault_status / primora_vault_list — local-vault state and metadata (names/urls/notes only); requires primora vault unlock on the host.
primora_vault_exec — runs primora commands with a vault secret injected into the child's env; vault/secrets/inject/agent/login/use and keys:create are denied so no response can carry a credential.
primora_secrets_list / primora_secrets_set — project-vault metadata and write-only storage. No reveal or delete: agents consume secrets through secret://NAME references in job payloads, resolved server-side at delivery.