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Tomas DvorakandDevin
182b0c49c2
- Geist/Geist Mono via @fontsource inside the Vite bundle — the Google Fonts <link> was blocked by the nginx CSP (style-src 'self'), so the dashboard silently fell back and phoned home on self-hosted instances. Fonts now serve from /assets under 'self' — CSP-clean, airgapped, no console violation. - mcp README: vault_exec described the old deny-list; rewritten for the allow-list contract. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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1.6 KiB
@primora/mcp
Primora MCP stdio server - exposes the platform as primora_* tools to any
MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.).
Build
npm run build --workspace @primora/mcp # → dist/server.js
Configure
Point your MCP client at node dist/server.js. The server shares the CLI's
config file - primora login once and both tools work. Env vars override:
PRIMORA_BASE_URL, PRIMORA_API_KEY, PRIMORA_ORG, PRIMORA_PROJECT.
Tools
30+ primora_* tools covering organizations, projects, buckets, objects,
collections, API keys, integrations, webhooks, scheduled jobs, telemetry,
and audit: primora_whoami, primora_list_projects,
primora_upload_object, primora_query_audit, primora_run_job, …
Secrets are agent-safe by design — values are never returned by any tool:
primora_vault_status/primora_vault_list— local-vault state and metadata (names/urls/notes only); requiresprimora vault unlockon the host.primora_vault_exec— runsprimoracommands with a vault secret injected into the child's env. A strict allow-list (read-mostly commands likewhoami,context,orgs:list,buckets:list,jobs:list,audit:list,events:send) — nothing that reads, writes, or moves a credential can run; file/path flags are rejected and the injected env name must be a safe identifier (loader hooks likeNODE_OPTIONSare blocked).primora_secrets_list/primora_secrets_set— project-vault metadata and write-only storage. No reveal or delete: agents consume secrets throughsecret://NAMEreferences in job payloads, resolved server-side at delivery.