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Tomas DvorakandDevin
182b0c49c2
- Geist/Geist Mono via @fontsource inside the Vite bundle — the Google Fonts <link> was blocked by the nginx CSP (style-src 'self'), so the dashboard silently fell back and phoned home on self-hosted instances. Fonts now serve from /assets under 'self' — CSP-clean, airgapped, no console violation. - mcp README: vault_exec described the old deny-list; rewritten for the allow-list contract. Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai) Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
39 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
1.6 KiB
Markdown
# @primora/mcp
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Primora MCP stdio server - exposes the platform as `primora_*` tools to any
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MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.).
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## Build
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```bash
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npm run build --workspace @primora/mcp # → dist/server.js
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```
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## Configure
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Point your MCP client at `node dist/server.js`. The server shares the CLI's
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config file - `primora login` once and both tools work. Env vars override:
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`PRIMORA_BASE_URL`, `PRIMORA_API_KEY`, `PRIMORA_ORG`, `PRIMORA_PROJECT`.
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## Tools
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30+ `primora_*` tools covering organizations, projects, buckets, objects,
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collections, API keys, integrations, webhooks, scheduled jobs, telemetry,
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and audit: `primora_whoami`, `primora_list_projects`,
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`primora_upload_object`, `primora_query_audit`, `primora_run_job`, …
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Secrets are agent-safe by design — values are never returned by any tool:
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- `primora_vault_status` / `primora_vault_list` — local-vault state and
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metadata (names/urls/notes only); requires `primora vault unlock` on the host.
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- `primora_vault_exec` — runs `primora` commands with a vault secret injected
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into the child's env. A strict allow-list (read-mostly commands like
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`whoami`, `context`, `orgs:list`, `buckets:list`, `jobs:list`,
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`audit:list`, `events:send`) — nothing that reads, writes, or moves a
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credential can run; file/path flags are rejected and the injected env
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name must be a safe identifier (loader hooks like `NODE_OPTIONS` are
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blocked).
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- `primora_secrets_list` / `primora_secrets_set` — project-vault metadata and
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write-only storage. No reveal or delete: agents consume secrets through
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`secret://NAME` references in job payloads, resolved server-side at delivery.
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