Primora/CHANGELOG.md

# Changelog

All notable changes to Primora. Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/); versions follow [SemVer](https://semver.org/).

## [Unreleased]

### Added

- **Agent setup prompt** — a "Set up with an AI agent" dialog that mints a fresh `write`-scoped API key (ingest + reads + non-admin mutations, never key-minting) and renders a copyable prompt handing a coding agent everything it needs: the deployment endpoint, project id, the key itself, plus tasks to instrument error/metric/log/heartbeat reporting per component (`POST /api/v1/ingest` — works from any language), register the app's databases via `db-connections` (postgres → cassandra), wire the MCP server / CLI for future agents, and verify with a test event + deploy marker. Opens at the end of the new-project onboarding and is re-reachable from the project dashboard and Projects page; keys are shown only inside the prompt (revoke under Settings → API keys).
- **Local secrets vault in the CLI** (`@primora/cli` 0.6.0) — `primora vault init/status` and `primora secrets set|get|list|rm|import` manage an encrypted `~/.config/primora/vault.bin` (Argon2id 64 MiB/3/4 → XChaCha20-Poly1305, header bound as AEAD AAD, atomic writes). Entries carry value + optional `url`/`notes` metadata. Password via `PRIMORA_VAULT_PASSWORD`, `--password-file`, or hidden prompt; file path overridable with `PRIMORA_VAULT`. Clean-room format — no external vault compatibility.
- **Vault sessions** — `primora vault unlock --ttl 900` proves the password once and writes a TTL'd `vault.session` (0600); agents and scripts use the vault without the password. `primora vault lock` revokes immediately.
- **`primora agent` credential broker** — wraps a child process with dummy tokens and a loopback base URL; the proxy attaches the real secret on the wire per grant (TTL, cap 3600 s). Presets: `anthropic`, `openai`, `openrouter`, `groq`, `deepseek`, `xai`, `github`, `npm`; `--upstream name=https://…` covers arbitrary Bearer APIs. Base-URL broker, not TLS MITM — tools must honor a base-URL override.
- **`primora inject`** — runs a child process with vault secrets in its environment (`--all`, or `--env-file` templates containing `primora://NAME` refs). Nothing on disk, nothing in argv.
- **`primora stack:*` operator group** — `up`, `down`, `status`, `logs [service]`, `pull`, `backup` wrap `docker compose` in `--dir` (default cwd). `stack up --vault` materializes `.env` from the vault for the duration of the run (refuses to clobber an existing `.env` without `--force`, which swaps and restores it). `stack backup` writes a `pg_dump -Fc` of the platform database to `./backups`.
- **Vault MCP tools** (`@primora/mcp`) — `primora_vault_status`, `primora_vault_list` (metadata only — values are never returned), and `primora_vault_exec` which runs `primora` commands with a secret injected into the child environment; `vault`/`secrets`/`inject`/`agent`/`login`/`logout`/`use` and `keys:create` are denied so no response can carry a credential. (Hardened to a strict allow-list — see Security.)
- **Secrets Vault window in the desktop app** (`@primora/desktop`) — tray "Secrets Vault…" opens a dedicated window (`ui/vault.html`) covering init, timed unlock/lock with live countdown, secret list with copy-to-clipboard (values never displayed), add/delete, and `.env` import. IPC shells out to the `primora` binary (`PRIMORA_CLI` overrides), so desktop and terminal share one vault file and one crypto implementation; a missing CLI shows install guidance. Also reachable from the connect screen.
- **Project vault — server-side secrets** (`core.project_secrets`, migration 00011) — per-project secrets encrypted AES-256-GCM at rest via the existing encryptor. API: `GET/PUT/DELETE /projects/:projectID/secrets[/:name]` plus `POST …/reveal`. Lists return metadata only (name, url, notes, timestamps); reveal decrypts explicitly and is audit-logged (`secret.set`/`secret.revealed`/`secret.deleted`). Scheduled-job payloads reference secrets as `secret://NAME`, resolved to plaintext at delivery — refs are stored, values are not; unresolved or unconfigured refs fail the run loudly.
- **Vault page in the dashboard** — project secrets table with create/update, `.env` import, delete, and copy-to-clipboard reveal; plus a "This machine" card when running inside the desktop shell that drives the local vault through the same Tauri IPC commands as the vault window.
- **CLI remote mode** — `primora secrets set|get|list|rm|import --remote` operates on the project vault via the existing API auth (`--project` overrides). `get --remote` is the explicit reveal path; `list --remote` never returns values.
- **Project-vault MCP tools** — `primora_secrets_list` (metadata only) and `primora_secrets_set` (write-only). No reveal or delete tools — agents consume secrets through `secret://NAME` references in job payloads without holding plaintext.
- **Realtime channel subscriptions** (`@primora/client`) — `createRealtimeClient({ endpoint, key, projectId })` opens the project SSE stream (`/realtime/stream`) via fetch + ReadableStream (EventSource can't send `X-API-Key`). `channel("documents").on("created", cb)` subscribes by event namespace (`document`/`object`/`issue`/`deploy`, `"*"` for all); auto-reconnects with capped exponential backoff; `onStateChange` reports `connecting|open|reconnecting|closed`.
- **Telemetry alert rules** (`core.alert_rules`, migration 00012) — `heartbeat_silence` (component quiet for N minutes) and `error_spike` (≥N errors in a sliding window) rules per project, evaluated every 60 s. Rules fire on state transitions only: `alert.fired` once when breached, `alert.resolved` on recovery — both are first-class webhook event types and ride the existing signed dispatcher + realtime stream. API: `GET/POST /projects/:id/alerts`, `PUT/DELETE …/alerts/:ruleID`; dashboard manages them from Integrations → Webhooks; `firing` shows the breached components.
- **Inbound webhooks** (`core.inbound_hooks`, migration 00013) — public ingest endpoints `POST /api/v1/hooks/<token>` (the token is the credential). `event` mode republishes the body as `inbound.received` domain events through the signed dispatcher + realtime; `job` mode triggers a scheduled-job run with the received body as its payload (`triggered_by: "hook"`). Optional `secret` requires `X-Primora-Signature` HMAC-SHA256 — the same scheme outbound deliveries use. Bodies capped at 256 KiB. Managed from Integrations → Webhooks.
- **Document filtering and ordering** — `GET /collections/:id/documents` accepts `filter` (comma-separated `field.op.value`; ops `eq neq gt gte lt lte like in is`; dotted paths index into document data, `id`/`created_at`/`updated_at` filterable) and `order` (`field.asc|field.desc` list). Whitelisted parsing + parameterized values; plain lists unchanged. CLI: `primora documents list --collection <slug> --filter … --order …`.
- **HA scheduler leadership** — the job scheduler and alert evaluator each hold a session-scoped PostgreSQL advisory lock on a dedicated pinned connection, so multiple backend replicas scan for due work exactly once; manual and hook-triggered runs remain available on any replica. Leadership is released on shutdown and fails over automatically when a replica dies — verified live with a two-replica test.
- **Email templates + send log** (`core.email_log`, migration 00014) — the mailer renders registered templates (currently `invitation`) and every send — successful or failed — is recorded with template, recipient, subject, status, and error text. `GET /projects/:id/emails` lists recent sends; the Members page shows an "Email log" card under pending invitations.
- **S3-compatible object storage backend** — `BACKEND_STORAGE_DRIVER=s3` swaps the local disk store for any S3-compatible API (AWS, MinIO, Garage, R2) via a stdlib-only SigV4 implementation — no AWS SDK dependency. `S3_ENDPOINT`/`S3_REGION`/`S3_BUCKET`/credentials configure it; `S3_PATH_STYLE` (default on) covers MinIO/Garage, off for AWS virtual-hosted. The configured bucket is created on startup if missing; objects stream with computed SHA-256, `storage_path` records `s3://bucket/key`. Verified live end-to-end (bucket → put → get → copy → list → delete).
- **Functions** (`core.functions` + `core.function_runs`, migration 00015) — project-scoped JS/TS executed by a runtime binary on the backend host (`bun` or `deno`, per function). The JSON payload arrives on stdin and as `PRIMORA_PAYLOAD`; stdout/stderr are captured per run (capped at 64 KiB) with status, exit code and duration — `FUNCTIONS_RUNTIME`/`FUNCTIONS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`/`FUNCTIONS_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES` configure the runner. API: CRUD under `/projects/:id/functions`, `POST …/invoke` (502 + recorded run on failure), `GET …/runs`. Dashboard gains a Functions page: code editor, JSON payload invoke, live result, run history. Code executes with backend privileges — the documented self-hosted trust model.
- **Presigned object URLs** — `POST /buckets/:bucketID/object-presigns` mints SigV4 query-signed `GET`/`PUT` URLs (60 s–1 h TTL) so clients transfer large objects directly against S3 without proxying through the backend. Read role for downloads (object must exist — no key probing), write role for uploads. `S3_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT` rewrites the client-facing host for internal `S3_ENDPOINT`s; signatures bind the host so URLs are valid only where they were minted. The local driver returns a clear error — a presigned URL needs a real object API.
- **Desktop auto-updater** — `tauri-plugin-updater` wired end to end: minisign keypair, `createUpdaterArtifacts`, `latest.json` manifest built from signed artifacts on every release, and a silent background check on the connect screen offering "Update & restart" (download → verify → install → relaunch). Unsigned artifacts can never install — missing signature means no manifest, not a bypass. CI signs via `TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY` secrets; OS-level signing (notarization/Authenticode) remains open.
- **Release SBOMs** — CycloneDX SBOM for each published GHCR image (backend/auth/frontend) plus one for the source tree, attached to every GitHub Release via `anchore/sbom-action`.
- **Sandboxed function driver** — `FUNCTIONS_DRIVER=docker` runs every invoke in an ephemeral locked-down container: no network, read-only rootfs, 128 MiB memory, 0.5 CPU, 64 pids, non-root, all capabilities dropped. Source is injected via base64 env (no bind mount — works on Docker Desktop and remote daemons); timeout force-removes the container so nothing lingers. Verified live: code runs, network is unreachable inside, and deadline kills land.
- **Client events + presence** — `POST /projects/:id/events` publishes client-authored events (`custom.*` namespace enforced — system types can't be spoofed) through the same fan-out as system events: realtime subscribers, matching webhooks, and `event_pattern` functions all fire. Realtime now tracks presence: `presence.update` {online} broadcasts on every subscribe/unsubscribe (stream-only — never reaches webhooks or functions), `GET …/realtime/presence` reads the count. Client SDK gains `publish()` and `presence()`; CLI gains `events:send`.
- **Function triggers** (migration 00016) — three new ways to run a function, all through the same executor and run log. Scheduled jobs accept `function_id` instead of `url` (run status mirrors the exit code); inbound hooks gain `mode: "function"` — the received body becomes the function's stdin payload, acked immediately with the run recorded async; and `event_pattern` on a function (`document.*`, `*`, or an exact type) fires it detached whenever a matching domain event publishes — `{event, project_id, occurred_at, data}` as payload. Runs record trigger source: `manual`/`schedule`/`hook`/`event`. Dashboard: function event-trigger field, job target picker (URL or function), and inbound-hook function mode.
- **`GET /api/v1/context`** — actor self-discovery: for API keys returns scopes, key prefix, and the resolved organization + project (id/slug/name). Fixes the API-key onboarding dead end: `primora login --api-key` now validates the key against the instance before saving and seeds org/project context automatically; `primora use`, `context`, and `whoami` work under API-key auth via this endpoint.
- **CLI `orgs:rm` / `projects:rm` / `buckets:rm`** — destructive deletes gated behind `--yes` in non-interactive mode, interactive confirm otherwise. `buckets:rm` resolves id/slug/name.
- **Webhook wildcard subscriptions** — `events` accepts `*`, `<namespace>.*`, and `custom.*` patterns, matched at dispatch time via SQL `LIKE` — the same semantics function `event_pattern` already used. Client-published `custom.*` events can now be webhooked.

### Security

- **`primora_vault_exec` rewritten as an allow-list** — the deny-list was bypassed by colon-form commands (`["secrets:get","X"]` as a single token evaded the pair check), exposing every vault secret; `--remote` variants revealed project secrets; and the `secret` param was used verbatim as an env name, allowing `NODE_OPTIONS=--require <file>` host code execution. Now only a fixed read-mostly command set runs (`whoami`, `context`, `orgs:list`, `projects:list`, `buckets:list`, `objects:list`, `documents:list`, `jobs:list`, `jobs:runs`, `audit:list`, `keys:list`, `events:send`), path/file flags and `..` args are rejected, injected env names must match `^[A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]{0,63}$`, and loader-hook names (`NODE_*`, `LD_*`, `DYLD_*`, `PATH`, `BASH*`, `PYTHON*`, `GIT_*`, `SSL_CERT*`, `XDG_*`, …) are blocked. Verified: every prior bypass denied, allowed commands still inject.
- **SSRF hardening on webhook/job URLs** — cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `fd00:ec2::254`) are excluded from the link-local/private allowance, and pure decimal/hex "bare hostnames" (`2130706433`, `0x7f000001` — non-canonical IP encodings of loopback) are no longer treated as Docker service names.
- **Path params now `encodeURIComponent`** in all generated-client consumers (CLI, MCP, dashboard) — `encodeURI` left `?#&` intact, smuggling query segments through `{name}` params (e.g. `secrets/a?reveal=1`).
- **Strict base64 in `primora_upload_object`** — `Buffer.from(b64)` silently drops invalid characters; `contentBase64` is now validated (whitespace-tolerant) so corrupt input can't silently store garbage bytes.
- **MCP no-creds startup** — a missing config/API key previously threw inside `configureClient`, killing the process mid-handshake (protocol hang, stack on stderr). Startup now degrades: `initialize`/`tools/list` answer normally and every tool call returns the actionable error.

### Fixed

- **Silent CLI dispatch** — unknown commands, a bare `primora`, and group names without a verb exited 0 with no output. Now: unknown input errors with exit 1 (bare groups list their verbs), bare `primora` prints help.
- **Arg-parser numeric coercion** — `cac`/`mri` coerced numeric-looking flag values (`--value "007"` → `7`, `--value ""` → `0`), corrupting secrets and keys. Parsed options are now re-read as raw strings from argv for every non-boolean flag; `--value 007` round-trips intact.
- **`pgx.ErrNoRows` → 404** in the shared error mapper — missing resources returned raw "no rows in result set" 500s across all handlers.
- **Structured error hygiene** — `pgconn.PgError` codes map to clean statuses (23505 → 409 "resource already exists", 23503 → 409, 22001/54000 → 400 "value too large", 22021 → 400) instead of leaking SQLSTATE/constraint names; validator failures report `field is required`/`field failed <tag> validation`; a new `services.InputError` type maps service-layer input failures to 400 (webhook URL/event-type errors were 500s). Presign on the local driver returns `presign_unsupported` 400.
- **`fetch failed` polish** — connection failures report the cause code and suggest `primora context` instead of bare undici errors.
- **`login --json`** — the flag now emits JSON on both the session and API-key paths.
- **Dashboard fonts vendored** — Geist/Geist Mono now ship via `@fontsource` inside the bundle instead of a Google Fonts `<link>` the nginx CSP blocked (`style-src 'self'`). Removes the runtime Google dependency, works airgapped, and eliminates the console CSP violation.

## [0.7.1] - 2026-09-23

### Fixed

- **Self-hosted sign-up no longer requires mail infrastructure** — `sendTransactionalEmail` warned-and-returned when no transport was configured instead of throwing, so SMTP-less instances 500'd on sign-up. `sendVerificationEmail` now also catches transport failures; a broken SMTP cannot block account creation (verification stays optional).
- **Password managers detect the login form** — the email/password fields gained `id`/`name` attributes and `label for`/`id` pairing, and the email input uses `autocomplete="username"` (Proton Pass et al.).
- **Installer prebuilt path strips build blocks** — `install.sh` previously kept `*-build` compose blocks when pulling prebuilt GHCR images.

### Added

- **Static landing page** (`landing/`) — self-contained marketing site with bundled Geist fonts and product screenshots; deployed separately from the app artifacts.

### Infrastructure

- **Automatic releases on merge** — merges to `master` whose root `package.json` version has no matching `v*` tag now trigger the full release pipeline (GHCR images, CLI binaries, desktop bundles, npm tarballs, GitHub Release). Tag pushes still work as before.

## [0.7.0] - 2026-09-21

### Changed

- **Public sign-up closes by default after the first account.** On upgrade, existing instances keep their users but new public sign-ups are rejected until an admin enables them (Settings → Instance or `SIGNUP_ENABLED=true`). The oldest existing account is not automatically promoted — set `AUTH_ADMIN_EMAILS` or update `user.role` to `admin` manually if no platform admin exists.
- **OAuth providers require `PRIMORA_MANAGED=true`.** Self-hosted deployments are email/password only; GitHub/Google/Discord/Microsoft env keys are ignored without the flag.

### Added

- **Instance administration** — `core.settings` (migration 00010) stores in-app overrides that resolve ahead of `.env` and built-in defaults. New endpoints: `GET /instance/public` (unauthenticated login-page state), `GET/PUT/DELETE /instance/settings[/key]` (platform admin only — better-auth `user.role`, not org role). Manageable keys cover public sign-up, mail transport (Resend or SMTP), and API/user rate limits. Secrets are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest, never returned by the API, and decryptable by the auth service via the shared `PRIMORA_ENCRYPTION_KEY`.
- **Bootstrap + sign-up gating** — the first public sign-up becomes the instance admin; afterwards public sign-up is closed unless `SIGNUP_ENABLED=true` or the admin reopens it in Settings → Instance. `databaseHooks.user.create.before` gates only `/sign-up/email`, so admin-created users and OAuth flows bypass it.
- **Managed-tier OAuth gate** — `PRIMORA_MANAGED=true` is now required for GitHub/Google/Discord/Microsoft sign-in; self-hosted instances are email/password only. The login page hides the sign-up tab and social buttons according to `GET /instance/public`.
- **Settings → Instance tab** — platform admins edit sign-up, mail, and rate-limit settings in-app with source badges (in-app/env/default) and per-key reset.

## [0.6.0] - 2026-09-21

### Added

- **Scheduled jobs** — `core.scheduled_jobs` + `core.scheduled_job_runs` (migration 00009). Cron expressions and descriptors (`@hourly`, `@daily`, `@every 30m`, `*/15 * * * *`) parsed via robfig/cron; an in-process `JobScheduler` scans every 15 s, queues due jobs through a buffered channel, and collapses missed schedules into a single run. Endpoints under `/projects/:id/jobs`: list/create/update/delete, `GET …/jobs/:id/runs`, `POST …/jobs/:id/run` (manual execution). Jobs deliver a JSON envelope (event type, project/job/run IDs, trigger source, timestamp, static payload) via POST with `X-Primora-Signature: sha256=<hmac-sha256(body)>`, `X-Primora-Event`, `X-Primora-Job`, `X-Primora-Run` headers and a 10 s timeout. Secrets are AES-256-GCM sealed at rest; a generated secret is returned exactly once on create/rotate (`has_secret` thereafter). Run records carry status, trigger, HTTP status, duration, error text, and timestamps; history is pruned by retention. Reads require viewer+, writes admin/developer.
- **Domain events + realtime stream** — `PlatformService.publishEvent` fans project mutations out to realtime subscribers and matching webhooks through one path. New webhook event types: `job.run`, `document.created`/`updated`/`deleted`, `object.created`/`updated`/`deleted`. `GET …/projects/:projectID/realtime/stream` serves an SSE feed with 25 s keepalives and `?token=`/`?api_key=` query auth for `EventSource` clients.
- **Automation page** — SolidJS view with a Schedules tab (job table, create modal with schedule helper text, expandable run history, manual Run, enable/disable, delete, secret-shown-once banner) and a Live events tab (live/offline badge, pause, clear, auto-reconnect). Sidebar + command palette entries; demo-mode seeds and stubs included.
- **`primora jobs:*` CLI group** — `jobs:list`, `jobs:create <name> --schedule --url [--payload --secret --disabled]`, `jobs:run <job>`, `jobs:runs <job> --limit`, `jobs:rm <job> --yes`. Both `jobs list` and `jobs:list` spellings.
- **New `primora_*` MCP tools** — `primora_list_jobs`, `primora_create_job`, `primora_update_job`, `primora_delete_job`, `primora_list_job_runs`, `primora_run_job`. Webhook event schema extended to all new event types.

### Fixed

- **SSE broken by gzip middleware** — `Compression()` wrapped every `Accept-Encoding: gzip` response, and the gzip buffer swallowed each `Flush()`, so `EventSource` received headers then silence and closed. Paths ending in `/stream` now bypass compression; this repaired the pre-existing telemetry stream too.
- **Event payloads serialized as base64** — `document`/`object` fields inside domain-event envelopes were `json.RawMessage` placed into `map[string]any`, which marshals as base64. They're now wrapped so the raw document embeds in the event JSON.
- **Auth trusted origins ignored the configured public URL** — `docker-compose.yml` hardcoded `http://localhost` for `BETTER_AUTH_URL`, `AUTH_BASE_URL`, and `VITE_APP_URL`, so any non-default `NGINX_PORT` or domain broke sign-in with a 403. All three now read `.env` with localhost defaults.
- **Frontend auth base URL on non-default ports** — the bundled default baked `http://localhost`; `auth-client` now resolves `/auth` against `window.location.origin` (absolute, as better-auth requires) when `VITE_AUTH_BASE_URL` is unset.

### Security

- **Managed platform connections removed** — `platform-postgres`/`platform-dragonfly` seeds carried the backend's own `DATABASE_URL`/`DRAGONFLY_URL` into every project, where any member could run arbitrary queries through DBX against `core` tables. The seeds are gone and migration 00008 deletes existing managed rows. Operators keep direct `psql`/`redis-cli` access.
- **Connection passwords encrypted at rest** — `core.db_connections.config.password` is now AES-256-GCM sealed (`enc:v1:` marker) via `PRIMORA_ENCRYPTION_KEY`; decrypted only when registering the connection with DBX. Migration 00008 strips pre-existing plaintext passwords.
- **DBX naming** — connection names now prefix the full project UUID; the previous 8-hex prefix could collide across projects and alias the wrong credentials.

### Infrastructure

- **One-line installer** — `install.sh` (`curl | bash`) fetches the compose files, generates secrets, pulls prebuilt GHCR images, and falls back to a source-tarball build when packages aren't published.
- **CI image pipeline** — per-app buildx matrix with GHA layer cache, container-contents smoke checks, Trivy scans, `docker compose config` validation, and `edge`/`sha-*` GHCR publishing on master.
- **Fixed release image pushes** — tags were rendered with the mixed-case owner (`ghcr.io/Dvorinka/...`), which GHCR rejects; owner is now lowercased, unblocking tagged releases.

## [0.5.0] - 2026-09-16

### Added

- **Desktop app** (`apps/desktop`) — Tauri 2 thin shell for Linux/Windows/macOS. First run shows a connect screen asking for the deployment URL (validated, stored in `~/.config/dev.tdvorak.primora/config.json`); the webview then renders the same SolidJS bundle the server serves. System-tray icon (Show / Change Server / Quit), close-to-tray, single-instance. No embedded backend or database — the self-hosted model is preserved.
- **PWA support** — `vite-plugin-pwa` generates a Workbox service worker and `manifest.webmanifest` in every frontend build. The app shell (JS/CSS/icons/index.html) is precached; `/api`, `/auth`, and `/mailpit` are `NetworkOnly` and excluded from the SPA navigation fallback; Google Fonts assets are cached for a year. Installability icons (192/512/maskable + apple-touch-icon) rasterized from the existing SVG mark.
- **Install prompt** — `PwaInstallBanner` captures `beforeinstallprompt` and offers an in-app install action inside the shell; dismissal persists in `localStorage`.
- **Desktop release artifacts** — `release.yml` gains a `desktop` job (ubuntu/macos/windows matrix) producing AppImage/deb/rpm, dmg, and msi/nsis bundles, attached to the GitHub Release alongside the existing images and CLI binaries.

- **Connector framework** — `core.integrations` (migration 00005) stores per-project external services with type, base URL, `has_credentials` flag, health status/`last_health_at`. Credentials are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest (`PRIMORA_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, hex/base64, 32 bytes; dev fallback outside production) and are never serialized to the client. Endpoints under `/projects/:id/integrations`: list, create, delete, `POST …/test` (5s health check against the base URL with stored credentials).
- **Rybbit connector** — `GET …/integrations/:id/analytics` proxies a self-hosted Rybbit instance server-side (`/api/organizations` site discovery, `/api/sites/:site/overview`, time series, top pages/referrers) and returns a normalized shape. The API key never leaves the server; read-only, no tracking proxy. Site selection via `?site=` or the integration's configured `site_id`.
- **Outbound webhooks** — `core.webhooks` + `core.webhook_deliveries`. Endpoints: list/create/update/delete under `/projects/:id/webhooks`, `GET …/deliveries`, `POST …/test`. Events: `issue.created` (new error fingerprint on ingest), `deploy.marker` (`POST …/deploy-markers`, records version/ref/environment/note in the audit log), `webhook.test`. HTTPS required for public targets; plain HTTP allowed for private/self-hosted sinks. Deliveries are signed `X-Primora-Signature: sha256=<hmac-sha256(body)>` and retried by an in-process dispatcher (buffered queue, 3 attempts, quadratic backoff, 10s timeout, crash recovery on boot). Generated secrets are returned exactly once.
- **Integrations page** — SolidJS view (Connectors + Webhooks tabs): connector table with status/test/inline Rybbit analytics panel, webhook table with per-endpoint delivery log, secret-shown-once banner, deploy-marker form. Demo-mode stubs included.
- **New `primora_*` MCP tools** — `primora_list_integrations`, `primora_create_integration`, `primora_delete_integration`, `primora_test_integration`, `primora_integration_analytics`, `primora_list_webhooks`, `primora_create_webhook`, `primora_update_webhook`, `primora_delete_webhook`, `primora_list_webhook_deliveries`, `primora_test_webhook`, `primora_create_deploy_marker`.
- **Telemetry (IMS merge)** — `POST /api/v1/ingest` accepts a single event or a ≤500-event batch, authenticated by existing project `prm_` API keys via `X-Primora-Key` (or `X-API-Key`); `OPTIONS` preflight + permissive CORS for browser SDKs. Components auto-register on first use (`frontend`, `backend`, `database`, `android`, `desktop`, `web`, `other`). Event types: `error`, `metric`, `log`, `heartbeat`, `event`; missing fingerprints are derived from component + first message line.
- **Issue grouping** — `GET /projects/:id/issues` groups errors by fingerprint (count, severity, first/last seen, latest component).
- **Telemetry read APIs** — `GET …/events` (type/component/fingerprint filters, `before` cursor), `GET …/components`, `DELETE …/components/:id`, `GET …/telemetry/stats` (bucketed series + component health + totals + metric names over 1h/24h/7d/30d), `GET …/telemetry/metrics/series` (avg/p50/p95/max per bucket).
- **Live SSE stream** — `GET …/telemetry/stream` pushes inserted events through an in-process hub (buffered subs, drop-on-slow, 25s keepalives). `?api_key=`/`?token=` query auth for `EventSource` clients.
- **Telemetry page** — SolidJS view: health tab (totals, activity histogram, component status table), issues with drill-through to filtered events, event list with payload modal, metric series table, and an Integrate tab with SDK/cURL snippets. Live badge driven by the SSE stream; demo-mode stubs included.
- **`@primora/client` SDK** — `createPrimoraClient({ endpoint, key, component, kind, base })` with `captureError`, `captureMetric`, `captureLog`, `captureEvent`, `heartbeat`, `installAuto`, queued batching and `keepalive` flushes.
- **New `primora_*` MCP tools** — `primora_list_issues`, `primora_list_events`, `primora_telemetry_stats`, `primora_metric_series`.

### Fixed

- Workspace dependency pins updated to `0.3.0` (`@primora/api-client`, `@primora/shared-types`) — `npm ci` in the frontend image was resolving the unpublished `0.2.0` spec from the registry.

## [0.3.0] - 2026-09-16

### Added

- **Databases (DBX integration)** — the Go backend keeps `dbx-mcp` as a persistent stdio subprocess (`internal/dbx`, lazy start, one retry on failure) and exposes its tools as REST under `/projects/:id/db-connections/*` (list/create/delete/test, databases, tables, describe, schema context, SQL query, Redis command). DBX tool/subprocess failures surface as 502.
- **Connection registry** — `core.db_connections` (migration 00003). Credentials are stored server-side and never serialized to the browser (`has_password` flag only). Non-default `ssl`, `driver_profile` supported.
- **First-party connections** — `platform-postgres` and `platform-dragonfly` auto-register on every project (derived from `DATABASE_URL`/`DRAGONFLY_URL`) and cannot be deleted (409 `managed_connection`).
- **Databases page** — SolidJS view with connection list, database/schema/table browser, column inspector, SQL editor (⌘/Ctrl+Enter), result grid with row-detail modal, and a Redis console. Demo mode stubs included.
- **Backend image now Debian-based** — `dbx-mcp` requires glibc; the Dockerfile installs the pinned `packages-v0.4.88` release with SHA256 verification.

## [0.2.0] - 2026-09-15

### Added

- **`primora` CLI** (`apps/cli`) — `cac`-parsed, `@clack/prompts` interactive UX. Login (session or API key), org/project context, `orgs`, `projects`, `buckets`, `objects` (list/upload/download/rm), `keys`, `audit list --follow`. Every command accepts `--json`. Both `primora orgs list` and `primora orgs:list` spellings.
- **`@primora/mcp` server** (`apps/mcp`) — stdio MCP server exposing 14 `primora_*` tools (whoami, orgs, projects, buckets, objects up/download/delete, API keys, audit query) over the generated client. Shares the CLI's `~/.config/primora/config.json` credentials.
- **Authentication → Users panel** — better-auth `admin` plugin on the auth service (list/set-role/ban/unban/remove users) plus a dashboard view with search, role selects, and ban/delete actions. Bootstrap admins with `AUTH_ADMIN_EMAILS` in `.env`.
- **Mobile bottom navigation** — Instagram-style tab bar below 1024px (Overview · Storage · Collections · Auth · Menu), safe-area aware; Menu opens the full drawer. Fixes a dead-navigation gap at 768–1023px.
- **Release pipeline** — semver tag → GitHub Release with changelog notes, GHCR images (`primora-backend`/`auth`/`frontend`), compiled `primora`/`primora-mcp` binaries for Linux/macOS/Windows, npm tarballs, optional `npm publish` via `NPM_TOKEN` secret.

### Fixed

- **Object downloads broken for all gzip-negotiating clients** — the compression middleware left the handler's `Content-Length` (raw size) on gzipped bodies, so undici/browsers saw truncated streams. `gzipWriter.Write` now drops `Content-Length`.
- **nginx 502s after every container restart** — upstreams were resolved once at startup. nginx now resolves `backend`/`auth`/`frontend`/`mailpit` through Docker's embedded DNS (`127.0.0.11`) per request.

### Changed

- API keys now document the real `prm_<prefix>_<secret>` format (README previously claimed `pk_live_`).

## [0.1.0] - Initial commit

- Phase 0 foundation: Go/Gin backend, Better Auth service, SolidJS dashboard, Postgres + Dragonfly, nginx gateway, Docker Compose stack.